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CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF BUREAUCRACY: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS FROM THE UNIVERSITY

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Abstract:
There is a large body of literature detailing how modern bureaucracy is hostile to entrepreneurial thinking and creative behavior and this paper aims to detail how this impacts university faculty. Individuals in large bureaucratic organizations may have chosen to work there because they were bureaucratically-minded to begin with, or became bureaucratically-minded after a time of being subjected to the bureaucratic organization's culture. Universities have been studied in-depth in this regard. College campuses have a complex dual organization: with a bureaucratic administration and a presumably more creative non-bureaucratic faculty. It is also presumed that students would not be as bureaucratic-minded as administrators. Previous research, using a culture survey instrument, measured and compared culture dimension scores of bank management and family-firm management: finding that bank managers had a more bureaucratic culture profile while family-firm management had a more entrepreneurial profile. This study uses that research as a comparison benchmark in extending the same instrument to university administrators, faculty, art students and business students. All campus respondents were from California State University Dominguez Hills (CSUDH), a campus in Los Angeles. Findings show that all CSUDH campus segments, with small exceptions for student groups, share essentially the same campus culture. The campus culture, in all of its parts, is significantly more bureaucratic than bank management culture; with family-firm management culture being much more entrepreneurial than all other groups. This research provides practical essential background for those who would seek to improve higher education.

Key words: bureaucracy, university, banks, family-firms, culture, administrators, faculty.

JEL classifications: M1, M14, Z1, Z19.

INTRODUCTION

The belief that modern bureaucracy is hostile to entrepreneurial thinking and creative behavior goes back at least to the 1950s (Schumpeter, 1950; Whyte, 1956; Merton, 1968). Bureaucracy increases obstacles to innovation and the achievement of goals, decreases staff moral and motivation, and reduces performance (DeHart-Davis & Pandey, 2005). Public universities ideally should answer to the public's needs, however, Weber's view is that bureaucrats are faceless to the public, resulting in a lack of transparency (Weber, 1978; Cho et al., 2013).

Specialization, centralization, and formalization define bureaucratic organizations (Bolin and Härenstam, 2008) and the administration and campus culture of large public universities. The connections between bureaucratic centralization and "power distance" (Hofstede et al., 1990) indicate a low power distance culture would be much more suitable for innovation and creativity. Thus, culture influences creativity (Hirst et al., 2009).

Centralization is the main control mechanism in bureaucracies (Pugh et al., 1968) along with formal standards (Pugh and Hickson, 1993) which are prominent in the California State University (CSU) 23-campus system. Top-down systems, particularly in education, restrict organizations in terms of exactly what and how daily operations are performed (Bolin and Härenstam, 2008). Bureaucracy is based on process, procedure, and obedience to rules (Bolin and Härenstam, 2008) and not specifically on outcomes such as student and faculty creativity.

Sørensen, J.B. (2007) finds that employees of large mature firms are less entrepreneurial and thus more bureaucratic-minded. Sørensen's study indicates that organization structure influences the organization's availability of would-be entrepreneurs, and especially organizational

opportunities to be involved in creative processes. Many studies show that organization characteristics, especially size, affect entrepreneurial and bureaucratic behavior (Gompers et al., 2005; Dobrev and Barnett, 2005; Stuart and Ding, 2006).

The contextual approach to explaining a lack of entrepreneurial behavior states that organizational structure controls entrepreneurial activity separately from the effects of individual characteristics (Freeman, 1986; Dobrev and Barnett, 2005; Stuart and Sorenson, 2005). These results are also affected by the unknown factors of why employees choose to work in a bureaucratic organization. The dispositional approach states that individual characteristics result in entrepreneurial behavior (or a lack of), such as individual differences in risk avoidance (Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979; Cramer et al., 2002; Ekelund et al., 2005) individual ability (Lucas, 1978; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000), and ambition (McClelland, 1961). An employee's preference in working for a large or small company (or university), and to avoid working in a bureaucracy might also be related to these same characteristics (Parker, 2006).

It may be that employees who choose large bureaucratic organizations such as CSU are less entrepreneurial-minded to begin with and also that the administration of these organizations demoralize and inhibit those who are entrepreneurially-minded. Even the most creative employees (and faculty) may avoid expressing entrepreneurial tendencies in an organization where nothing creative can succeed and where attempting such may negatively affect a career (Whyte, 1956; Sørensen, 2007).

Creativity is critical for firm survivability (Amabile, 1988; Oldham & Cummings, 1996) and team organization is central in encouraging or discouraging individual creativity (Amabile & Conti, 1999; Hirst et al., 2009; Shalley et al., 2004). Individual creativity is affected by team factors that invite or constrain entrepreneurial and creative thinking (Hirst et al., 2011). Team environments may encourage creativity or team bureaucracy may discourage creativity; however absence of bureaucracy does not encourage and the absence of encouragement does not by itself restrain (Hirst et al., 2009). The two main aspects of group bureaucracy that regulate employee behavior, decision-making centralization and rule formalization, correlate with low employee discretion and thus low employee creativity and entrepreneurship. Decentralized decision-making actively serves to empower employees while low formalization has a passive effect (Hirst et al., 2009).

Merton (1968) finds that "bureaucracies, with their rigidly defined roles, elaborated hierarchies, and emphasis on rules and routines, lead to an over-concern with strict adherence to regulations which induces timidity, and conservatism." Similarly, Schumpeter (1950) found "rationalized and specialized office work will eventually blot out personality, the calculable result, the 'vision'… and the bureaucratic method of transacting business and the moral atmosphere it spreads . . . exert a depressing influence on the most active minds." A large body of research shows that workers display greater inflexibility and conformity in highly controlled roles in bureaucratic organizations (Kohn and Schooler, 1982).

Bureaucracy may also reduce entrepreneurial thinking and action by limiting entrepreneurship skill acquisition. Entrepreneurial work encompasses a broad range of roles, and professionals with a wide-ranging background will naturally gravitate to entrepreneurial organizations (Lazear, 2005). Professionals in bureaucratic organizations tend to work with a very limited job description; and the typical career would emphasize deep but narrow ranges of skills. Work background would thus be greater in organizations that don't have a well-defined hierarchy, with lower levels of entrepreneurial thinking and action with bureaucratic professionals.

Additional research finds that organization professionals with greater understanding of the outside environment are more likely to see entrepreneurial prospects and have relationships with outside markets (Saxenian, 1994; Sorenson and Audia, 2000; Gompers et al., 2005). With greater bureaucraticy, process and procedure dominate to a greater degree, limiting innovation. Careers in large, bureaucratic universities may provide greater financial prospects and security than in smaller, less bureaucratic colleges. Greater emphasis on process and procedures in the larger universities means that personal skills and relationships has less effect on professional success. This raises the

professional risk of moving to riskier, more creative opportunities, and employees of the largest and most bureaucratic universities should be less likely to be creative or entrepreneurial.

The literature generally finds that professionals pursue careers in alignment with preferences for independence and creativity (Mortimer and Lorence, 1979; Spenner, 1988; Halaby, 2003). Also, bureaucratic organizations select job candidates on the basis of fit and may have low regard for those who seem to prefer outcomes over process. Research data indicates that professionals with entrepreneurial mindsets gravitate to entrepreneurial organizations. Halaby (2003), found that the offspring of fathers that were self-employed preferred careers that offered lower-paid but broad job descriptions over financial rewards and better pensions. Children of self-employed parents are substantially more likely to become self-employed themselves (Aldrich et al., 1998; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000).

Results show an inverse metric with organization size and professionals moving to self-employment. Professional movement into entrepreneurships from organizations with four or less employees is almost three times higher than from organizations employing more than 1,000. This relationship is also true with organizational longevity. Professionals in new organizations (no more than three years of age) have a 60% greater prospensity to become self-employed than those in organizations of more than ten years of longevity.

Angiola, et al., (2018) finds a university bureaucracy problem, which has two divergent entities (Mintzberg, 1983): a bureaucratic administration and a professional faculty. Faculty are more aligned with their profession and field than the university campus. In contrast, the bureaucratic administration hierarchy identifies with the standardization of processes proceedures. Campus administrators' strategic plans may fail to be fully implemented because faculty and administrative bureaucracy would not align with the bureaucracy's desired outcomes (Buckmaster, 1999, Barnabè and Riccaboni, 2007).

Angiola, et al., (2018) found the following in universities:

(1) Strategic plans were mainly created by technicians and administrative employees.

(2) Strategic plans were mainly about operations rather than strategy.

(3) University objectives were not linked to outcomes. Objectives that begin with a strategic plan tend to take bureaucratic detours, and will be seen by staff simply as a procedure.

Public schools have low performance due to top-heavy centralized bureaucracies that hobble teachers' ability to create and implement front-line solutions to issues (Chubb and Moe, 1990). They find that administrative bureaucrats do not understand the real-world issues of their schools. Bureaucrats usually don't have the background or daily experience with students. Education is what takes place between teachers and students and not on what administrators do. This disconnect also makes results in attempting to measure student performance with metrics that may not actually measure educational attainment. Dysfunctional educational bureaucracy results from the political control of public education, including universities (Chubb and Moe, 1990).

Bohte (2001) finds negative relationships between bureaucracy, measured at both the central and campus administration levels, and student performance. Educational top-down systems restrict organizations in exactly what and how daily operations are performed (Bolin and Härenstam, 2008). Their results support Chubb and Moe's contention that bureaucracy has a negative effect on school performance. Higher numbers of administrative personnel lead to lower student performance on student SAT scores. For every 1% increase in the ratio of central administrators to full-time school district employees, average district SAT scores declined by nearly 10% (Bohte, 2001).

The aim of this paper is to detail how bureaucracy impacts university faculty. Previous research, using a culture survey instrument, measured and compared culture dimension scores of bank management and family-firm management: finding that bank managers had a more bureaucratic culture profile while family-firm management had a more entrepreneurial profile. This study uses that research as a comparison benchmark in extending the same instrument to university administrators, faculty, art students and business students in order to form a better understanding of the organizational culture underpinnings of the faculty entrepreneurial and/or bureaucratic mindset.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND APPROACH

Leung, Bond et al (2002) constructed five social axioms, measuring beliefs, which were designed to be used at the individual level (spirituality, social cynicism, reward for application, fate control, and social flexibility). Spirituality is the degree of belief in the supernatural or religious factors of existence. Social Cynicism is the belief that "manipulation is effective in success"; encompassing a "negative view of people and groups and a mistrust of institutions". Reward for Application is the belief that persistence and working hard will have a positive result for the individual. Fate Control is the belief that "events can be controlled and that events may be predetermined and predictable". Social Flexibility is the belief that social behavior is situational and may be contradictory. High scores on Spirituality, and Social flexibility; along with low scores on Social Cynicism have been significantly associated with an entrepreneurial culture profile (see Family-Firm Management in Table 1 below) (Brice, 2013, Brice and Richardson, 2009).

Geert Hofstede (1980, 1991, and 2001) constructed a number of instrument items measuring values. Two of his constructs, Power Distance and Masculinity (vs. Femininity), may measure occupations, while the others are suitable only at the level of entire nations or cultures. Power Distance is defined as the "extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a society expect and accept that power is distributed unequally" (Hofstede, 2001) and measures a preference for autocratic leadership. Social classes and occupations exhibit different class cultures. Lowest status occupations and education measured highest on Power Distance (Hofstede, 1991).

The construct Masculinity (vs. Femininity) concerns gender cultural differences on a 'tough' values versus 'welfare' values continuum. "Masculinity stands for a society in which social gender roles are distinct: Men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success; women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life. Femininity stands for a society in which social gender roles overlap: Both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life" (Hofstede, 2001). Low scores on Power Distance and Masculinity have been found to be significantly aligned with an entrepreneurial culture profile (see Family-Firm Management in Table 1 below) (Brice, 2013, Brice and Richardson, 2009).

This study examines the correlation between these seven cultural constructs and the university roles of administrators, faculty, art students and business students. The cultural profiles (in terms of construct scores) of these four groups are compared with that of bank management who have been found to represent a bureaucratic profile; and family-firm management who were found to represent a contrasting entrepreneurial profile (Brice, 2013, Brice and Richardson, 2009).

It was previously found that bank management scored significantly higher than family-firm management on Power Distance, Masculinity, and Social Cynicism; and significantly lower on Social Flexibility and Spirituality (see Table 1 below). Score differences for Reward for Application and Fate Control were inconclusive (Brice, 2013, Brice and Richardson, 2009).

Table no. 1. Previous Research - Family Firm and Bank Management Significant Differences

	Power Distance	Masculinity	Spirituality	Social Cynicism	Reward for Application	Fate Control	Social Flexibility
	PDI	**MAS**	**S**	**SC**	**RA**	**FC**	**SF**
Bank Management	2.710*	2.268*	3.106*	2.385*	3.653	2.498	3.095*
Family-Firm Management	2.382*	1.960*	3.397*	2.109*	3.629	2.506	3.354*
* Significant Differences							
Source: Brice and Richardson, 2009.							

It is expected that university administrators' construct score profiles, in comparison with faculty, will mirror the relationship between bank management bureaucrats and family-firm entrepreneurs. It is also expected that students' construct score profiles will also mirror that of

family-firm entrepreneurs; with faculties' profiles in-between that of administrators and students. Business students are expected to score more like bank management than art students on all constructs.

HYPOTHESES

H1: There will be significant differences between the six respondent groups on the seven construct score averages.

H2: University administrators will have a score profile closer to bank management on all constructs than with faculty and faculty will score closer to family firm management than university administrators. University administrators will score significantly higher than faculty on Power Distance, Masculinity, and Social Cynicism; and lower on Spirituality, Reward for Application, Fate Control and Social Flexibility.

H3: University art and business students will have a score profile closer to family-firm management on all constructs than with bank management, university administrators, or faculty.

H4: University art students will score lower than business students, administrators, and faculty on Power Distance, Masculinity, and Social Cynicism; higher on Spirituality, Reward for Application, Fate Control and Social Flexibility.

H5: University business students will score lower than administrators and faculty on Power Distance, Masculinity, and Social Cynicism; higher on Spirituality, Reward for Application, Fate Control and Social Flexibility.

METHODS

Six respondent groups were surveyed with an empirical survey instrument measuring seven culture constructs using Bond's five social axiom instrument items (Leung, Bond et al, 2002) and two of Hofstede's cultural dimension instrument items (Hofstede, 1980, 1991, and 2001). The groups were: bank managers, family firm managers, art students, business students, university administrators, and university faculty. The culture constructs were: Power Distance, Masculinity, Spirituality, Social Cynicism, Reward for Application, Fate Control, and Social Flexibility. Data for bank management and family-firm management was collected from Madison, Wisconsin and Little Rock, Arkansas in 2013. All university data for administrators, faculty and students was collected from the California State University Dominguez Hills in 2016.

A one-way multivariate analysis of variance (one-way MANOVA) was conducted in SPSS to understand whether there were differences in respondent group's scores on seven different construct dependent variables (Power Distance, Masculinity, Spirituality, Social Cynicism, Reward for Application, Fate Control, and Social Flexibility); and the independent variable is Group, which has six independent groups (university administrators, university faculty, bank managers, family-firm managers, art students, and business students). Post hoc tests were conducted, and Tukey's Test used to determine which groups differed.

Table no. 2. Multivariate Tests

Effect		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Intercept	Pillai's Trace	.995	12482.652[b]	7.000	435.000	.000	.995
	Wilks' Lambda	.005	12482.652[b]	7.000	435.000	.000	.995
	Hotelling's Trace	200.870	12482.652[b]	7.000	435.000	.000	.995
	Roy's Largest Root	200.870	12482.652[b]	7.000	435.000	.000	.995
Group	Pillai's Trace	1.001	15.698	35.000	2195.000	<.001	.200
	Wilks' Lambda	.163	28.178	35.000	1832.310	<.001	.304

	Hotelling's Trace	4.176	51.716	35.000	2167.000	<.001	.455
	Roy's Largest Root	3.957	248.175[c]	7.000	439.000	<.001	.798

Table no. 3. Culture Construct Averages

	Power Distance	Masculinity	Spirituality	Social Cynicism	Reward for Application	Fate Control	Social Flexibility
	PDI	**MAS**	**S**	**SC**	**RA**	**FC**	**SF**
University Admin.	3.37	3.70	2.99	2.71	3.77	**2.61^**	3.58
University Faculty	**3.45^**	3.59	**2.90***	2.69	**3.61***	2.60	**3.75^**
Bank Mgt.	2.56	2.39	3.16	2.49	3.81	**2.43***	**2.93***
Family Firm Mgt.	**2.47***	**2.19***	**3.35^**	**2.36***	3.85	2.51	3.07
Art Students	3.34	3.72	3.11	**3.13^**	3.83	**2.61^**	3.73
Business Students	3.38	**3.79^**	3.18	2.93	**3.96^**	2.55	3.67
^ Highest Score							
*** Lowest Score**							

Table no. 4. Group Significant Differences

	Power Distance	Masculinity	Spirituality	Social Cynicism	Reward for Application	Fate Control	Social Flexibility
	PDI	**MAS**	**S**	**SC**	**RA**	**FC**	**SF**
Admin/Faculty	0.990	0.931	0.965	1.000	0.631	1.000	0.238
Admin/Bank Mgt	**<0.001***	**<0.001***	0.504	0.205	0.983	0.627	**<0.001***
Admin/Family Firm Mgt	**<0.001***	**<0.001***	**0.002***	**0.004***	0.814	0.957	**<0.001***
Admin/Art Students	1.000	1.000	0.868	**0.003***	0.966	1.000	0.297
Admin/Bus Students	1.000	0.933	0.428	0.305	0.114	0.996	0.779
Faculty/Bank Mgt	**<0.001***	**<0.001***	0.076	0.333	0.100	0.713	**<0.001***
Faculty/Family Firm Mgt	**<0.001***	**<0.001***	**<0.001***	**0.012***	**0.020***	0.978	**<0.001***
Faculty/Art Students	0.930	0.800	0.345	**0.002***	0.130	1.000	0.999
Faculty/Bus Students	0.993	0.314	0.064	0.232	**<0.001***	0.999	0.786
Bank Mgt/Family Firm Mgt	0.701	**0.005***	**0.016***	0.331	0.959	0.869	**0.006***
Bank Mgt/Art Students	**<0.001***	**<0.001***	0.995	**<0.001***	1.000	0.480	**<0.001***
Bank Mgt/Bus Students	**<0.001***	**<0.001***	1.000	**<0.001***	0.081	0.753	**<0.001***
Family Firm Mgt/Art Students	**<0.001***	**<0.001***	**0.034***	**<0.001***	0.999	0.929	**<0.001***
Family Firm Mgt/Bus Students	**<0.001***	**<0.001***	0.123	**<0.001***	0.329	0.998	**<0.001***
Art Students/Bus Students	0.995	0.996	0.977	0.229	0.392	0.994	0.896
*** Significant Difference**							

RESULTS

H1: There will be significant differences between the six respondent groups on the seven construct score averages.

H1 is supported as there was a statistically significant difference between all groups based on Group, $F = 28.18$; Wilk's $\Lambda = 0.163$, partial $\eta^2 = .30$ as shown in Table 2 above. Thus the groups are statistically distinct.

H2: University administrators will have a score profile closer to bank management on all constructs than with faculty and faculty will score closer to family firm management than university administrators. University administrators will score significantly higher than faculty on Power Distance, Masculinity, and Social Cynicism; and lower on Spirituality, Reward for Application, Fate Control and Social Flexibility.

H2 is not supported. Although the descriptive statistics for university administrators, faculty and bank management show different average scores for all constructs (see Table 3: Culture

Construct Averages below), when CSUDH administrators and faculty are compared only with each other, there are no significant differences between these two groups (see Table 4: Group Significant Differences below). Adding additional confirmation of the cultural closeness between administrators and faculty, is that bank management has significant differences in scores with both campus groups on identical constructs (Power Distance, Masculinity and Social Flexibility); as does family firm management (Power Distance, Masculinity, Spirituality, Social Cynicism and Social Flexibility).

CSUDH university administrators and faculty both scored significantly higher than both bank and family management on Power Distance, Masculinity and Social Flexibility. In addition, both scored significantly lower than family firm management on Spirituality and higher on Social Cynicism.

High Power Distance, Masculinity, and Social Cynicism along with lower Spirituality and Social Flexibility are key attributes of bank management bureaucracy (see Table 1 above) as found in previous research (Brice, 2013; Brice and Richardson, 2009). The even greater Power Distance and Masculinity scores of CSUDH university administrators and faculty gives support to the proposition that they are more culturally bureaucratic than bank managers. Lower Spirituality and higher Social Cynicism scores than family firm management also indicates a culture of bureaucracy. The Social Flexibility scores that are higher than for both bank and family firm management do not indicate greater bureaucracy but may indicate that campus bureaucracy at CSUDH demands a much higher degree of social game playing than does the more structured bank management or more entrepreneurial family management culture.

H3: University art and business students will have a score profile closer to family-firm management on all constructs than with bank management, university administrators, or faculty.

H3 is partially supported. At CSUDH, art and business students do not score significantly different than both university administrators and faculty on all constructs; except that art students scored significantly higher than both on Social Cynicism; and business students scored significantly higher than faculty on Reward for Application.

For the construct Social Cynicism, art students scored the highest of all groups; significantly higher than administrators and faculty. Family firm management scored the lowest of all groups; significantly lower than administrators and faculty. Thus, art student's score profile was closer to administrators and faculty than to family firm managers (see Tables 3 and 4 above).

For the construct Reward for Application, faculty had scored the lowest of all groups; significantly lower than family firm management. Business students had the highest score of all groups; significantly higher than faculty but not significantly higher than family firm management. Thus, business student's score profile was closer to family firm managers in this one construct than with administrators and faculty (see Tables 3 and 4 above).

H4: University art students will score lower than business students, administrators, and faculty on Power Distance, Masculinity, and Social Cynicism; higher on Spirituality, Reward for Application, Fate Control and Social Flexibility.

H4 is partially supported. CSUDH art and business students had no significant score differences on any construct. However, art students scored significantly higher on Social Cynicism than both administrators and faculty (see Tables 3 and 4 above).

H5: University business students will score lower than administrators and faculty on Power Distance, Masculinity, and Social Cynicism; higher on Spirituality, Reward for Application, Fate Control and Social Flexibility.

H5 is partially supported. CSUDH art and business students had no significant score differences on any construct. Business students had no significant score differences with administrators on any construct, but scored significantly higher on Reward for Application than faculty (see Tables 3 and 4 above).

CONCLUSIONS

This study compared the cultural profiles of CSUDH university administration, faculty, art students and business students with each other and that of bank management bureaucracy and family-firm entrepreneurs. Previous research has found differing culture dimension score profiles for bank management and family-firm management (see Table 1 above) with bank management having a profile that can be said to be bureaucratic in comparison to the more entrepreneurial family-firm management (Brice, 2013, Brice and Richardson, 2009). There has been very limited empirical quantitative data to determine the cultural underpinnings of bureaucracy and to examine the relationship between university administration, faculty, and students.

Here, it was supposed that university administration would more closely resemble bank bureaucracy and that faculty would more closely resemble entrepreneurial family-firm management. Similarly, while all students were thought to be more culturally entrepreneurial than either administrators or faculty, art students would be more so than business students.

Results were clear and consistent that CSUDH administrators and faculty had virtually the same cultural scores. Art and business students also had the same culture scores as each other and close to the same scores as administrators and faculty. In general, all CSUDH campus groups have score profiles much more bureaucratic than even bank management. Campus groups were strongly consistent in their conformity; while differing greatly from the two off-campus groups which also differed from each other.

The only exception to this generality is that CSUDH business students had the highest score for all groups on Reward for Application; higher even than family-firm entrepreneurs. This culture dimension measures the belief that persistence and working hard will have a positive result. Art students, on the other hand, differed by having the highest score of all groups on Social Cynicism. This culture dimension measures the belief that manipulation is effective in success. Thus, art students have an even greater degree of cultural bureaucracy than other campus groups; with business students being the only campus group to show any aspect of entrepreneurial culture at all.

California State University Dominguez Hills is part of one of the largest university systems in the world (with 23 campuses). The size of this educational bureaucracy, along with being subject to the strong centralized control of the CSU Chancellor's office, may make this campus more of a state bureaucracy than the average public university outside of California.

This research has practical ramifications in that it may be used as essential background concerning campus culture by those who would seek to improve higher education. A limitation of this research would be that it was conducted at California State University Dominguez Hills. It can be seen that faculty here do not enjoy the usual faculty status found elsewhere in the nation. CSU faculty have a faculty union that exerts control over contracts and all issues pertaining to faculty employment conditions. An Academic Senate replaces the traditional Faculty Senate, and is presided over by the CSUDH President and Provost; with all of the college Deans in attendance as well. Department Chairs do not have dedicated offices with administrative assistants and do not have a Chair's normal level of authority. Departments do not vote on their own faculty hires and colleges do not vote on the hiring of College Deans either as is common elsewhere. The hiring of tenure-track faculty is centered within the office of Academic Affairs, which reports to the Provost's office. Deans request their first choice and the Provost commonly vetoes. Thus, the status of faculty at CSUDH is much reduced, compared to state universities across the nation, and may tend to share the bureaucratic administration culture to a greater than normal. Of course, the security of tenure and a generous retirement plan, that a large system like CSU provides, only enhances bureaucratic tendencies. For future research this survey instrument could be conducted at US state and private universities elsewhere in order to find if CSUDH is an outlier and in what direction it is so.

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