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REAL COMPETITION LEADS TO SUBSTANTIAL SAVINGS IN ROMANIAN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT OF VEHICLES?

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Abstract:

The article analyzes the real competition in public procurement for the supply of vehicles in Romania and the size of the obtained savings. For this, a sample consisting of 185 procurement procedures was used, procedures that took place between 17.02.2015 and 22.07.2019 in Romania.

The influence of competition on the savings obtained in public procurement procedures has also been studied by other authors. These authors found that as competition increases, the prices offered decrease, thus obtaining significant savings, but after receiving a certain number of offers, the decrease of the offered prices stops.

The article aims to confirm / disprove these conclusions in the case of the analyzed sample, to determine the number of offers from which the offered prices do not decrease and if the realized savings are substantial.

Also, within the article, a unifactorial linear regression was performed that verified whether the number of bidders was influenced by the size of the estimated value and a multifactorial linear regression was performed that verified whether the weight of the obtained savings was influenced by the number of offers received and the estimated value of the procedure.

Key words: public procurement, competition, savings, purchase price, vehicle

JEL classification: H57, H83

1. INTRODUCTION

Both in the periods of economic growth and especially in the periods of economic crisis, goverments are under increasing pressure from the public opinion to spend public funds as efficiently as possible, that is to achieve their goals with the lowest costs.

One of the ways to reduce costs is to encourage competition.

Thai et al., (2009) considers that in order to achieve substantial savings to a procurement procedure there must be at least 4 offers. The situation is worse when 3 offers are received or even catastrophic when only one offer was receiced (Thai et al., 2009).

The explanation is that at a procedure involving 4 bidders, anti-competitive agreements are much more difficult to reach, on the one hand the bidders reducing the price to win the procurement procedure and on the other hand the contracting authority making substantial savings.

The formula of the achieved savings (S), that is the relative decrease of the final price (FP) to the estimated value of the procedure (EVP) was used by Hanak and Muchova, (2015), this being:

$$S = (EVP - FP) / EVP \quad (1)$$

Gugler, Weichselbaumer and Zulehner, (2014) have analyzed the size of mark-ups used by bidders during the periods of economic growth compared to those used during times of economic crisis. The authors found that in times of economic crisis, due to increased competition because of the lower demand, bidders have used average mark-ups of 1.5%, eight times smaller than those of the periods of economic growth (12%).

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Gupta, (2002) analyzed the level of competition by using a sample of 1,937 bids for the construction of highways in the US state of Florida between 1981 and 1986. The author found that,

in order to reach the maximum of competition, were necessary 6 – 8 offers. Above this level, any additional offer that was received within the procurement procedure did not reduce the final price (Figure no. 1).



Figure no. 1. Graphical representation of the maximum level of competition (X)
Source: Gupta, (2002)

Gupta, (2002) found that by increasing the number of sumitted offers from 2 to 6 had the consequence of obtaining average savings of 9 - 10% and by increasing the number of offers from 2 to 8 led to savings of 12 – 14%.

Brannman et al., (1987) determined the main factors that influence the final price of a procurement procedure. The authors consider that these factors are: number of received offers, the type of products or services that are the subject of the procurement procedure, the type of procedure and the characteristics of the acquisition domain. The authors analyzed 6 types of procedures, at 4 of them the maximum level of competition was registered after receiving 7 - 8 offers and at the other 2 types the maximum level of competition was registered after receiving 5 offers. Consequently, the authors confirmed the findings of Gupta, (2002) according to which the price decrease stopped after 6 – 8 offers have been received.

Rose-Ackerman, (1999) analyzed how the competition and savings are influenced by corruption and anti-competitive agreements in the field of public procurement. The author found that when the risks of corruption and anti-competitive agreements are low, then at the procedures with only 3 offers it can be obtained savings as big as those with 6 offers.

After analyzing the procurement procedures for standardized products, Gineitiene and Serpytis, (2011) found that by increasing the number of submitted offers from 1 to 2, savings of more than 10 – 20% have been achieved.

Similar results were obtained by Ilke, Rasim and Bedri, (2012), who after analyzing a sample of 90,089 procurement procedures in Turkey, they found that for every additional offer received, an average price reduction of 3.9% was obtained. Another interesting conclusion of the authors was that at the procedures with high values more bidders participated, meaning that the number of received offers depends on the size of the estimated value of the procedure.

A similar conclusion was reached by Pavel, (2010). He analyzed the procurement procedures carried out in the Czech Republic for the contruction of highways and railways between 2004 and 2009 and found that each additional offer received led to average savings of 3.275%. Another conclusion of the author was that the biggest 5 bidders in the field reduced the price and won procurement procedures so that they keep their market share (the share of contracts won did not decrease).

Sipos and Klatik, (2013) found that there were procurement procedures with two offers received in which the obtained savings were bigger than those with 3 – 4 offers. The autors also found that at the procedures with a final stage of electronic auction, prices lower by 5% were obtained.

Most authors who analyzed the relation competition – savings **concluded that there is a directly proportional relationship between the competition and savings** (or an inverse proportional relationship between the competition and final price), **the maximul level of competitiveness being reached after receiving 6 – 8 offers**, after which the price does not decrease.

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study is based on the analysis of specialized literature and on highlighting the main conclusions and findings of the authors who analyzed the competition – savings relationship.

Also a sample will be extracted from Romanian Electronic Public Procurement System (SEAP), sample that will contain official data on procurement procedures carried out in at least the last 3 years in Romania for the purchase of vehicles.

Use of official data extracted from SEAP presents the following advantages: the data have high accuracy and relevance and have national coverage for the whole territory of Romania.

The results of the sample will be analyzed to obtain confirmation or rejection of the conclusions from the previous studies.

Furthermore, by using regression models it will be verified whether there are any links or dependencies between the elements of the sample.

4. THE ANALYSIS OF THE REAL COMPETITION AND ACHIEVED SAVINGS OBTAINED IN THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT OF VEHICLES IN ROMANIA

The sample of data extracted from SEAP containing the data from 185 procurement procedures carried out between 17.02.2015 and 22.07.2019 in Romania for the supply of vehicles is presented in detail in Annex no. 1.

The main elements that were extracted for each procurement procedure were: the number of offers received, the estimated value of the procedure, the final awarded value of the procedure, if the procedure had / did not have a final stage of electronic auction and the type of award criterion used by the contracting authority.

From the analyzed sample it can be observed that **an average number of 1.62 offers were received for each procedure, the average savings obtained being 7.48%**. In terms of size, these savings are small which means that these are not substantial.

An example of this is the government agency GSA (General Services Administration) from the USA which manages a fleet of 215,000 vehicles serving 76 government agencies.

GSA purchase in a centralised manner a variety of vehicles: cars, buses, minibuses, ambulances, trucks etc, meaning over 50,000 vehicles each year making substantial savings to the US federal budget (GSA, Overview 2018). Due to aggregate demand, vehicles are purchase directly from manufacturers with discounts of over 21% compared to the sale price through the network of dealers (GSA, Vehicle Buying, 2018).

The average awarded value of a procedure was about 940,000 euros, excluding VAT. This low value motivates **the adoption of measures like the aggregation of demand and centralisation of procurement procedures** in order to achieve bigger savings.

In the 185 procedures analyzed, the following types of award criteria were used: the best quality-price ratio – 17 procedures (weight 9.19%), the lowest price – 166 procedures (weight 89.73%) and the best quality-cost ratio – 2 procedures (weight 1.08%).

The analysis of these factors shows that the main factor of differentiation of the offers was the price with a weight of 89.73% (Figure no. 2).



Figure no. 2. The structure of the award criteria
Source: Based on the data in Annex no. 1

A final stage of electronic auction was used in 34 procedures out of the 185 (18.38% weight). For these procedures an average saving of 11.02% was obtained. Considering the fact that for the remaining 151 procedures an average saving of 6.68% was obtained, it follows that **in the procedures with the final stage of electronic auction, additionl savings of 4.34% were obtained, which confirms the conclusion of Sipos and Klatik, (2013)** who found additional savings of 5%.

The graphical representation of the weights of the savings (column 10 of Annex no. 1) depending on the number of offers received (column 7 of Annex no. 1) is shown in Figure no. 3. This figure shows that **between the nuumber of offers received and the realized savings there is a directly proportional relationship (inversely proportional to the final price)**, which confirms the conclusions of previous studies.



Figure no. 3. Graphical representation of the directly proportional relationship between the number of offers and savings
Source: Based on the data in Annex no. 1

Considering the fact that in 120 procedures a single offer was received (weight 64.86%), in 38 procedures two offers was received and in 14 procedures three offers was received, **it is not possible to determine the point** (X – number of offers received) **from which the competitiveness is maximum**, prices do not decrease and savings do not increase (Figure no. 4). Moreover, the total weight of the procedures in which 1, 2 or 3 offers were received was 92.97%.



Figure no. 4. Graphical representation of the point (X) from which competitiveness becomes maximum

Source: author's conception

As we mentioned before, after having duly analyzed the auctions conducted in Turkey in the period 2004 – 2006, Ilke, Rasim and Bedri, (2012) found that public procurement with higher estimated values have attracted more bidders and that is why *the size of the estimated value has a directly proportional impact on the number of offers.*

We verify the existence of such a relationship in the submitted sample of 185 procedures by using a **linear unifactorial regression model** with the following form:

$$y = a + bx \quad (2)$$

where:

y – number of offers submitted (column 7 of Annex no. 1);

x – estimated value of the procedure, in thousands lei, without VAT (column 8 of Annex no. 1);

a – residual variable which represents the effects of other factors, with unimportant influences on y variable;

b – factor of independent variable x.

The results of the linear unifactorial regression model are shown in Table no. 1.

From the results of the linear regression can be noticed that the residual variable (a) (or intercept) has the value of 1.5670, meaning that if the estimated value of the procurement procedure (x) would be zero, based on the regression model, then in the procedure it would be received 1.56 offers.

The factor of independent variable (b) is 0.00001061, meaning that by increasing the estimated value of the procedure (x) with 1,000 lei, the number of offers submitted (y) will increase by 0.00001061.

The correlation ratio (R) has the value of 0.2311 and it indicates that between the number of offers submitted (y) and the estimated value of the procedure (x) there is no significant link (the existing link is weak).

The coefficient of determination (R^2) is 0.0534 and it shows that only 5.34% of the variation in the number of offers submitted (y) is explained by the estimated value of the procedure (x). It can also be observed that the mean square error deviation has the value of 1.0704, which is high.

Table no. 1. The results of the linear unifactorial regression model (y – number of offers submitted, x – estimated value of the procedure)

Regression Statistics	
Multiple R	0.231145854
R Square	0.053428406
Adjusted R Square	0.048255883
Standard Error	1.07041282
Observations	185

ANOVA

	df	*SS*	*MS*	*F*	*Significance F*
Regression	1	11.83511385	11.83511385	10.32927491	0.001547658
Residual	183	209.6783997	1.145783605		
Total	184	221.5135135			

	Coefficients	*Standard Error*	*t Stat*	*P-value*	*Lower 95%*	*Upper 95%*	*Lower 95.0%*	*Upper 95.0%*
Intercept	1.567063742	0.080508338	19.46461425	1.89268E-46	1.408219835	1.725907649	1.408219835	1.725907649
X Variable 1	1.06102E-05	3.30133E-06	3.213918934	0.001547658	4.09665E-06	1.71238E-05	4.09665E-06	1.71238E-05

Source: author's calculations

After taking into account the results of the linear unifactorial regression model, **it can't be established a substantial link between the number of offers submitted and the estimated value of the procedure**. In consequence, **the conclusion of Ilke, Rasim and Bedri, (2012) isn't confirmed for the analysed sample.**

In the case of the sample of 185 procurement procedures, in order to verify if there is **a relationship between the weight of the obtained savings, the number of offers received and the estimated value of the procedure**, we use a linear multifactorial regression model with the following form:

$$y = a + bx_1 + cx_2 \quad (3)$$

where:

y – weight of the obtained savings (%) (column 10 of Annex no. 1);

x_1 – number of offers submitted (column 7 of Annex no. 1);

x_2 – estimated value of the procedure, in thousands lei, without VAT (column 8 of Annex no. 1);

a – residual variable which represents the effects of other factors, with unimportant influences on y variable;

b, c – factors of independent variables x_1 and x_2.

The results of the linear multifactorial regression model are shown in Table no. 2.

As it can be seen, the residual variable (a) (or intercept) has the value of - 0.24859.

The factor (b) of independent variable x_1 is 4.76574, which means that **upon receiving an additional offer, the weight of the obtained savings will increase by 4.76%.**

Table no. 2. The results of the linear multifactorial regression model (y – weight of the obtained savings, x_1 – number of offers submitted, x_2 - estimated value of the procedure)

Regression Statistics	
Multiple R	0.573263893
R Square	0.328631491
Adjusted R Square	0.321253815
Standard Error	7.520436915
Observations	185

ANOVA

	df	*SS*	*MS*	*F*	*Significance F*
Regression	2	5038.55199	2519.275995	44.54403999	1.79245E-16
Residual	182	10293.36879	56.55697139		
Total	184	15331.92078			

	Coefficients	*Standard Error*	*t Stat*	*P-value*	*Lower 95%*	*Upper 95%*	*Lower 95.0%*	*Upper 95.0%*
Intercept	-0.248597753	0.991118256	-0.250825521	0.802231954	-2.204157362	1.706961856	-2.204157362	1.706961856
X Variable 1	4.765744025	0.519357283	9.176234135	9.73568E-17	3.741008462	5.790479589	3.741008462	5.790479589
X Variable 2	6.97517E-07	2.38399E-05	0.029258396	0.976690566	-4.63406E-05	4.77356E-05	-4.63406E-05	4.77356E-05

Source: author's calculations

This result confirms the conclusions of the research of the following authors:

- Gineitiene, Z. and Serpytis, K., (2011) who concluded that receiving an additional offer can lead to significant savings, for some types of products even greater than 10% or 20%;

- Ilke, O., Rasim, O. and Bedri, K., (2012) who concluded that for each additional offer received, the final price was lower on average by 3.9%;

- Pavel, J., (2010) who concluded that on average each additional bidder who participated in the procedure led to a reduction of the final price by 3.275%.

The factor (c) of independent variable x_2 is 0.000000697, which means that with the increase of the estimated value by 1,000 lei, the weight of the obtained savings will increase by 0.0000006%.

The correlation ratio (R) has the value of 0.5732 and it indicates that there is a significant link between the weight of the obtained savings and the two independent variables.

The coefficient of determination (R^2) is 0.3286 and it shows that 32.86% of the variation in the weight of the obtained savings (y) is explained by the two independent variables. The mean square error deviation has a high value of 7.5204.

Thereby, for the analyzed sample, it can be seen that **there is a significant connection between the weight of the obtained savings and the number of offers, each additional offer leading to an increase of savings by 4.76%**.

As we mentioned, **in 120 procedures only one offer was reveived** (eight 64.86% of the total). Considering the fact that for these procedures the average weight of the savings was only 3.82%, it results that **these procedures had a reduced efficiency of spending the budgetary funds**.

A possible cause of the large number of single offer procedures **is the anti-competitive agreements concluded between the bidders**. Representatives at national level of vehicle manufacturers participate in procurement procedures and require dealers not to participate in these procedures. Dealers are only allowed to sell vehicles to individuals.

Thus, **free competition is distorted**, which leads to inefficient spending of budgetary funds. Relevant in this regard is the fact that in 73 procedures out of the total of 185 (weight 39.45%) have been obtained weights of savings lower than 1%.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The article analyzes the influence of the real competition on the obtained savings in a sample of 185 procedures carried out between 17.02.2015 and 22.07.2019 in Romania for the supply of vehicles.

The article pointed out that between the obtained savings and the number of offers there is a directly proportional relation, the average saving being 7.48%, which is not substantial one.

Given the high weight of the procedures with 1, 2 or 3 offers, it was not possible to identify the point (the number of offers received) from which the competitiveness becomes maximum and the savings stop growing.

A possible cause of the large number of procedures for which a single offer has been received is the anti-competitive agreements concluded between the national representatives of the producers and dealers.

After applying a unifactorial linear regression, no significant connection could be established between the number of offers received and the estimated value of the procedure and as a result of a multifactorial linear regression it was found that there is a significant connection between the weight of the obtained savings and the number of offers received.

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Annex no. 1: Situation of the number of tenders submitted within procurement procedures for vehicles carried out in Romania between 17.02.2015 and 22.07.2019

No.	Award notice number	Award notice date	Object of procurement	Factors that influence the size of savings obtained				Final value awarded of the procedure (lei, without VAT)	Saving weight obtained (%)
				Award criterion type	Procedure with / without final stage of e-auction	Number of submitted offers	Estimated value of the procedure (lei, without VAT)		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	10=[(8)-(9)]/8
1	CAN1018856	22.07.2019	vehicles	best price-quality ratio	no	3	44,483,172.27	43,102,545.72	3.10
2	CAN1018856	22.07.2019	vehicles	best price-quality ratio	no	3	137,647,064.10	127,989,225.00	7.02
3	CAN1018856	22.07.2019	vehicles	best price-quality ratio	no	4	257,512,606.22	219,257,820.00	14.86
4	CAN1018856	22.07.2019	vehicles	best price-quality ratio	no	3	128,193,277.14	89,123,100.00	30.48
5	CAN1019116	20.07.2019	vehicles	lowest price	no	4	5,001,680.67	3,753,782.40	24.95
6	CAN1012338	20.07.2019	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	9,340,762.90	9,298,904.00	0.45
7	CAN1012338	20.07.2019	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	7,834,033.65	7,747,500.00	1.10
8	SCNA1020010	19.07.2019	vehicles	lowest price	no	4	523,361.00	438,624.00	16.19
9	SCNA1006152	02.07.2019	vehicle	lowest price	no	3	648,000.00	491,460.24	24.16
10	SCNA1018900	01.07.2019	ambulance	lowest price	no	1	154,000.00	154,000.00	0.00
11	SCNA1006835	01.07.2019	vehicles	lowest price	no	3	291,000.00	256,154.76	11.97
12	SCNA1018764	28.06.2019	van	lowest price	no	2	159,663.86	122,356.80	23.37
13	CAN1017817	26.06.2019	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	2,521,008.40	2,142,857.00	15.00
14	CAN1017621	21.06.2019	vehicles	lowest price	yes	3	624,454.99	398,629.41	36.16
15	SCNA1006751	19.06.2019	vehicles	lowest price	no	4	289,915.95	252,762.12	12.82
16	SCNA1006751	19.06.2019	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	347,899.15	333,655.00	4.09
17	SCNA1018211	19.06.2019	ambulance	lowest price	no	1	645,360.00	539,798.00	16.36
18	SCNA1018115	18.06.2019	minibus	lowest price	yes	2	507,600.00	507,500.00	0.02
19	SCNA1018107	18.06.2019	vehicles	lowest price	no	2	280,000.00	215,500.00	23.04
20	SCNA1019632	12.06.2019	passenger cars	lowest price	no	3	599,158.00	536,187.19	10.51
10	CAN1016846	07.06.2019	vans	lowest price	no	7	1,270,000.00	896,803.00	29.39
21	SCNA1017407	04.06.2019	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	503,300.00	503,300.00	0.00
22	SCNA1017092	29.05.2019	passenger car	lowest price	no	1	360,000.00	360,000.00	0.00
23	SCNA1016996	28.05.2019	vehicle	lowest price	no	1	227,791.00	197,182.16	13.44

24	SCNA1006946	27.05.2019	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	315,000.00	269,390.85	14.48
25	CAN1014385	18.05.2019	vans	lowest price	no	2	816,000.00	809,500.00	0.80
26	SCNA1016516	17.05.2019	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	138,655.46	137,955.00	0.51
27	CAN1015688	15.05.2019	passenger cars	best price-quality ratio	no	1	1,545,920.17	1,457,571.27	5.71
28	SCNA1016152	13.05.2019	ambulance	lowest price	no	1	191,818.39	184,499.00	3.82
29	SCNA1015604	02.05.2019	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	397,250.00	396,466.46	0.20
30	CAN1014614	22.04.2019	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	256,000.00	255,767.23	0.09
31	CAN1014444	19.04.2019	passenger cars	lowest price	no	2	648,907.50	648,555.00	0.05
32	CAN1013264	26.03.2019	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	691,176.36	673,700.00	2.53
33	SCNA1012843	25.02.2019	vans	lowest price	no	1	148,276.38	148,226.38	0.03
34	SCNA1012671	19.02.2019	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	340,736.67	340,270.00	0.14
35	CAN1011466	12.02.2019	buses	lowest price	no	2	2,521,008.40	2,302,560.00	8.67
36	CAN1011082	31.01.2019	vehicles	lowest price	no	2	368,000.00	247,800.00	32.66
37	SCNA1011628	22.01.2019	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	221,837.77	221,540.00	0.13
38	SCNA1011194	10.01.2019	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	284,369.00	275,629.40	3.07
39	SCNA1011194	10.01.2019	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	80,000.00	70,799.53	11.50
40	CAN1009917	10.01.2019	passenger cars	lowest price	yes	5	9,870,000.00	9,107,302.80	7.73
41	CAN1009260	22.12.2018	vehicles	best price-quality ratio	no	1	1,218,487.30	1,124,000.00	7.75
42	CAN1009254	22.12.2018	vehicles	best price-quality ratio	no	1	1,732,612.00	1,680,000.00	3.04
43	CAN1009390	22.12.2018	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	942,165.85	858,663.00	8.86
44	CAN1009489	21.12.2018	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	118,487.00	117,998.00	0.41
45	CAN1009318	20.12.2018	passenger cars	best price-quality ratio	no	1	964,500.00	958,200.00	0.65
46	CAN1009274	20.12.2018	passenger cars	best price-quality ratio	no	2	10,721,596.72	8,313,772.80	22.46
47	CAN1008845	18.12.2018	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	940,000.00	929,000.00	1.17
48	CAN1008896	18.12.2018	vehicles	lowest price	no	3	1,213,048.35	1,104,477.00	8.95
49	CAN1008755	07.12.2018	passenger car	lowest price	no	1	68,890.00	68,500.00	0.57
50	SCNA1009517	06.12.2018	ambulance	lowest price	no	2	221,897.00	221,800.00	0.04
51	CAN1008578	05.12.2018	passenger cars	best price-quality ratio	no	1	692,000.00	691,950.00	0.01
52	CAN1008080	22.11.2018	vehicles	best price-quality ratio	no	2	4,754,346.19	4,375,662.29	7.97
53	CAN1007967	20.11.2018	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	2,746,770.00	2,744,176.01	0.09
54	CAN1007549	10.11.2018	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	1,266,807.00	1,187,700.00	6.24
55	SCNA1007697	07.11.2018	ambulance	lowest price	no	2	621,848.74	589,940.00	5.13
56	SCNA1007601	06.11.2018	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	145,496.64	144,956.00	0.37
57	CAN1007309	06.11.2018	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	324,447.15	324,429.49	0.01

58	SCNA1006686	22.10.2018	van	lowest price	no	2	160,924.36	160,800.00	0.08
59	SCNA1005296	15.10.2018	vehicles	lowest price	no	2	645,000.00	599,718.84	7.02
60	SCNA1006178	12.10.2018	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	168,067.00	154,448.18	8.10
61	CAN1005803	08.10.2018	autovehicule	lowest price	no	1	867,895.15	733,161.00	15.52
62	CAN1004707	18.09.2018	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	423,900.00	423,826.04	0.02
63	SCNA1003995	06.09.2018	autovehicule	lowest price	no	1	353,500.00	353,475.00	0.01
64	CAN1004080	06.09.2018	passenger cars	best price-quality ratio	no	1	936,050.40	840,000.00	10.26
65	SCNA1003111	22.08.2018	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	281,647.05	281,482.11	0.06
66	SCNA1001696	24.07.2018	ambulanțe	lowest price	no	2	441,176.48	366,710.00	16.88
67	CAN1001769	14.07.2018	vans	lowest price	no	3	926,800.00	814,148.00	12.15
68	CAN1018856	22.07.2019	autovehicule	best price-quality ratio	no	3	350,000.00	342,067.90	2.27
69	189221	20.06.2018	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	896,950.00	827,863.00	7.70
70	188839	31.05.2018	vans	lowest price	no	1	72,000.00	66,439.58	7.72
71	188711	23.05.2018	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	1,021,008.40	1,019,250.00	0.17
72	188146	24.04.2018	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	274,980.00	274,899.99	0.03
73	187965	12.04.2018	vehicles	lowest price	yes	1	1,134,000.00	937,076.00	17.37
74	187919	06.04.2018	vehicles	lowest price	no	3	516,806.72	516,700.00	0.02
75	187726	29.03.2018	van	lowest price	no	1	673,050.00	525,360.45	21.94
76	188445	13.03.2018	van	lowest price	no	2	828,000.00	797,400.00	3.70
77	187274	13.03.2018	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	294,117.64	293,500.00	0.21
78	186886	24.02.2018	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	1,690,000.00	1,688,993.00	0.06
79	186665	16.02.2018	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	2,615,338.80	2,041,751.00	21.93
80	186556	13.02.2018	minibuses	lowest price	no	2	599,060.00	599,039.27	0.00
81	185870	16.01.2018	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	157,500.00	157,500.00	0.00
82	185596	09.01.2018	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	17,680,368.82	16,405,522.07	7.21
83	185325	30.12.2017	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	62,412.87	54,620.25	12.49
84	185235	29.12.2017	van	lowest price	no	1	386,554.62	386,492.00	0.02
85	185188	28.12.2017	vans	lowest price	no	1	2,016,805.00	1,939,370.58	3.84
86	185175	28.12.2017	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	374,454.00	373,800.00	0.17
87	185165	27.12.2017	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	1,837,815.10	1,469,500.00	20.04
88	185001	21.12.2017	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	899,206.49	834,434.66	7.20
89	184942	20.12.2017	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	90,756.30	90,728.16	0.03
90	184607	09.12.2017	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	150,000.00	149,500.00	0.33
91	184510	07.12.2017	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	3,726,000.00	3,726,000.00	0.00

92	184404	06.12.2017	vans	lowest price	no	1	68,067.00	68,044.54	0.03
93	184353	05.12.2017	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	205,086.54	205,048.35	0.02
94	184013	22.11.2017	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	149,000.00	136,270.00	8.54
95	183667	10.11.2017	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	761,864.33	627,111.36	17.69
96	183316	02.11.2017	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	151,260.50	148,954.00	1.52
97	183321	01.11.2017	vans	lowest price	no	1	1,150,000.00	1,120,560.00	2.56
98	183144	27.10.2017	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	67,500.00	58,000.00	14.07
99	183119	26.10.2017	passenger cars	lowest price	da	1	67,500.00	67,495.00	0.01
100	182839	17.10.2017	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	365,294.04	292,464.60	19.94
101	182710	14.10.2017	vehicles	lowest price	no	3	650,000.00	649,198.00	0.12
102	182420	06.10.2017	passenger cars	lowest price	yes	1	206,722.00	204,598.74	1.03
103	182453	06.10.2017	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	1,888,206.83	1,888,180.00	0.00
104	182307	04.10.2017	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	1,176,470.60	1,118,454.94	4.93
105	182099	27.09.2017	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	542,200.00	335,000.00	38.21
106	181929	22.09.2017	vehicle	lowest price	yes	4	112,955.00	109,000.00	3.50
107	181969	22.09.2017	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	1,434,444.53	1,333,302.88	7.05
108	181932	22.09.2017	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	1,552,941.17	1,552,900.00	0.00
109	180973	24.08.2017	vehicle	lowest price	no	1	507,563.00	506,136.00	0.28
110	180558	08.08.2017	van	lowest price	no	1	1,858,700.00	1,715,850.00	7.69
111	180506	08.08.2017	vehicles	lowest price	yes	2	1,300,000.00	1,300,000.00	0.00
112	180200	29.07.2017	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	1,411,763.90	1,401,974.78	0.69
113	180183	28.07.2017	vans	lowest price	no	2	1,546,000.00	1,531,916.00	0.91
114	180032	25.07.2017	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	342,437.00	303,441.80	11.39
115	180057	25.07.2017	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	4,745,378.00	3,341,426.65	29.59
116	179776	18.07.2017	passenger cars	lowest price	no	2	900,000.00	849,762.55	5.58
117	179632	12.07.2017	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	6,722,689.00	6,381,567.00	5.07
118	176966	11.07.2017	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	991,064.40	948,365.84	4.31
119	178807	20.06.2017	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	738,350.00	736,870.00	0.20
120	173984	09.06.2017	passenger cars	lowest price	no	2	1,242,000.00	1,146,418.15	7.70
121	178281	31.05.2017	vehicles	lowest price	no	2	2,149,522.00	2,147,634.00	0.09
122	176338	16.03.2017	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	2,162,678.00	2,056,835.52	4.89
123	174703	05.01.2017	vehicles	lowest price	no	2	1,062,176.00	1,062,137.16	0.00
124	174455	28.12.2016	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	17,321,172.14	14,473,726.73	16.44
125	174418	24.12.2016	vehicles	best price-quality ratio	no	1	751,666.00	751,102.15	0.08

126	174373	23.12.2016	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	466,666.66	450,100.00	3.55
127	174124	15.12.2016	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	1,092,500.00	1,091,296.42	0.11
128	173961	10.12.2016	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	2,279,167.00	2,173,490.00	4.64
129	173693	30.11.2016	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	667,000.00	667,000.00	0.00
130	173683	30.11.2016	passenger cars	best price-quality ratio	yes	1	765,000.00	764,299.00	0.09
131	173609	26.11.2016	passenger cars	lowest price	yes	1	833,320.00	814,396.00	2.27
132	173458	22.11.2016	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	1,812,843.10	1,534,878.60	15.33
133	174695	05.11.2016	vehicles	lowest price	no	2	1,000,000.00	705,435.48	29.46
134	173012	02.11.2016	vehicles	lowest price	no	2	2,312,000.00	2,311,501.20	0.02
135	173043	02.11.2016	vehicles	lowest price	yes	1	1,238,333.33	823,100.00	33.53
136	172742	20.10.2016	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	333,333.33	332,943.65	0.12
137	172721	14.10.2016	passenger cars	best price-quality ratio	no	1	1,824,800.00	1,585,990.00	13.09
138	171828	23.08.2016	vehicles	lowest price	yes	4	1,959,166.67	1,464,300.00	25.26
139	171811	23.08.2016	passenger cars	best price-quality ratio	yes	3	2,000,000.00	1,761,696.00	11.92
140	171514	06.08.2016	passenger cars	lowest price	no	4	914,904.00	767,574.99	16.10
141	171412	03.08.2016	vehicles	lowest price	yes	2	984,504.76	822,000.00	16.51
142	171351	30.07.2016	minibuses	lowest price	yes	7	1,073,712.00	850,000.00	20.84
143	171130	22.07.2016	vans	lowest price	yes	5	1,138,000.00	1,038,139.62	8.78
144	170597	30.06.2016	vehicles	lowest price	no	2	966,600.00	940,541.36	2.70
145	169916	08.06.2016	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	796,250.00	579,800.00	27.18
146	169837	04.06.2016	truks	lowest price	yes	5	16,936,220.00	11,324,983.00	33.13
147	169631	28.05.2016	passenger cars	lowest price	yes	3	23,887,500.00	16,693,160.40	30.12
148	169498	25.05.2016	buses	lowest price	yes	5	2,330,007.19	2,329,269.41	0.03
149	177762	13.05.2016	vehicles	best price-quality ratio	no	2	729,200.00	692,000.00	5.10
150	170485	13.04.2016	vehicles	lowest price	yes	2	800,000.00	714,960.00	10.63
151	167224	05.03.2016	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	604,838.70	555,000.00	8.24
152	167120	02.03.2016	vehicles	lowest price	yes	2	141,254.40	127,351.72	9.84
153	165761	11.01.2016	van	lowest price	yes	1	221,350.28	220,430.33	0.42
154	165380	29.12.2015	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	305,793.00	305,792.73	0.00
155	165364	29.12.2015	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	750,000.00	746,031.91	0.53
156	164564	09.12.2015	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	133,500.00	132,861.18	0.48
157	164485	07.12.2015	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	428,226.00	395,383.27	7.67
158	164473	04.12.2015	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	774,596.77	756,804.98	2.30

159	164227	26.11.2015	passenger cars	lowest price	yes	1	841,050.00	695,112.93	17.35
160	164160	24.11.2015	vehicles	lowest price	no	2	5,228,721.00	4,774,371.56	8.69
161	163767	13.11.2015	passenger cars	lowest price	no	2	7,025,078.48	7,025,001.76	0.00
162	162998	23.10.2015	ambulances	lowest price	yes	1	60,000.00	55,038.78	8.27
163	163015	22.10.2015	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	126,843.86	126,800.00	0.03
164	162991	21.10.2015	vehicles	lowest price	yes	2	868,215.60	791,470.60	8.84
165	162822	17.10.2015	vehicles	lowest price	no	2	13,860,000.00	11,622,300.00	16.15
166	162611	09.10.2015	passenger cars	lowest price	yes	2	233,870.97	201,843.44	13.69
167	162273	01.10.2015	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	8,979,511.90	8,979,341.16	0.00
168	162264	30.09.2015	vehicles	best price-quality ratio	no	1	781,655.50	691,990.00	11.47
169	161680	12.09.2015	vans	lowest price	yes	2	150,000.00	149,000.00	0.67
170	161651	10.09.2015	van	lowest price	no	1	1,393,512.00	1,380,930.86	0.90
171	161488	05.09.2015	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	2,190,867.30	2,143,968.00	2.14
172	161441	04.09.2015	passenger cars	lowest price	yes	1	60,969,090.00	60,969,090.00	0.00
173	161119	27.08.2015	passenger cars	lowest price	yes	1	11,048,578.20	11,047,990.80	0.01
174	160916	20.08.2015	passenger cars	lowest price	yes	1	2,937,759.00	2,755,612.00	6.20
175	160640	11.08.2015	passenger cars	lowest price	yes	2	1,184,677.42	1,164,359.25	1.72
176	160485	06.08.2015	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	3,536,556.50	3,220,000.00	8.95
177	160454	05.08.2015	passenger cars	lowest price	yes	2	1,419,051.60	1,165,600.00	17.86
178	160066	23.07.2015	passenger cars	lowest price	yes	2	781,451.61	781,000.00	0.06
179	159941	18.07.2015	vehicles	lowest price	no	1	3,267,583.44	3,267,096.14	0.01
180	159892	17.07.2015	passenger cars	lowest price	yes	1	1,321,500.00	1,113,790.05	15.72
181	159251	30.06.2015	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	198,660.00	198,364.61	0.15
182	158907	18.06.2015	passenger cars	lowest price	no	1	971,774.19	971,643.04	0.01
183	158459	09.06.2015	van	lowest price	no	1	585,000.00	584,000.00	0.17
184	157639	13.05.2015	vehicles	lowest price	no	3	1,462,719.77	1,428,243.88	2.36
185	155126	17.02.2015	vehicles	best price-quality ratio	no	1	44,483,172.27	43,102,545.72	3.10
TOTAL						**300**	**951,272,598.05**	**826,194,198.24**	**1,384.40**
AVERAGE VALUE (TOTAL/185) (lei, without VAT)						**1.62**	**5,142,014.04**	**4,465,914.59**	**7.48**
AVERAGE VALUE (euro, without VAT), 1 euro = 4.75 lei						**-**	**1,082,529.27**	**940,192.54**	**-**

Source: Electronic Public Procurement System (SEAP) in Romania